>>11010To clarify, I don't consider myself a "Euro-skeptic", as this term carries a lot of political and social baggage in Europe, especially in the East where Euro adoption is still undergoing or a present question, or in the UK obvs. I would describe my dislike of the Eurozone as more of a skepticism towards centralization of power and decision-making.
- The Euro makes sense for the "core" EU countries whose economies already had a tight degree of interdependence beforehand. There was already a monetary union of sorts between France and some neighboring states even before WWII. And many European currencies were pegged to bigger currencies, like the Deutsche Mark. In fact, the idea of a cross-country economic union isn't unique to the Euro. For example there are monetary unions in the Caribbean and Africa. There are also unofficial, de facto monetary unions like in North America, where the US dollar is valid legal tender in some surrounding countries, like Panama, the Pacific island compact states, and ironically the technically European Union territories of the Dutch Caribbean.
- The Euro, the European Union, and so on are descendants of post-World War II concerns about really figuring out this nation state stability thing, and progressing forward as a European continent. I believe we don't live in the same world that produced the relational conditions that led to the World Wars, and that preventing active conflict between European nations is not the dominant paradigm by which we should live under.
- The Euro was originally not just about integration and centralization, but was offered to the public as a *practical* improvement over their lives. In the 80s and 90s, digitalization had not taken course yet, and traveling between European countries meant carrying a mini-bank of currencies with you, planning ahead to visit currency exchanges, and the general headache and mathematics that comes along with juggling multiple currencies. Businesses had to deal with juggling multiple currencies as well. We don't live in that world anymore. I can swipe my card at any terminal and pay for whatever, and the thing is, I can do that even in a non-Euro country and the transaction is just the same. So this aspect of the Euro, which was very obvious and practical in its time, is obsolete.
- The economies of the core EU states and the rest of Europe are vastly different. A single currency, by design, isn't going to be flexible enough to cover a range of economies from the manufacturing powerhouse of Germany to peripheral, smaller, often much more rural places like Greece and Bulgaria. This came to a head in the 2010s for the former country, who suffered greatly in a debt crisis caused by domestic factors, but which was exasperated by rules set upon it by the Eurozone. I highly recommend watching a Yannis Varoufakis lecture on his time in office during that crisis, he's one of the very precious few leftist Euro critics out there.
- The other appeal of the European Union outside of economics and trade is the stability of centralized bureaucracy. A centralized power protects each member state and allows them to coordinate politically and militarily. As I said, this is an idea that started after World War II, but took on new character during the Cold War, the fall of communist governments, and now the dynamic between the US and Russia. With the economic details of Eurozone integration being opaque to the common man (and even to most in the bureaucracy, but they won't admit it), this east-west dynamic is the core understanding of the Eurozone and the central axis around which almost every discussion or argument about the Euro rotates around. This is the social baggage I mentioned in my disclaimer at the top of the comment. Being a "Euro-skeptic" is a good guarantor of other right wing sentiments, most of the time entirely unrelated to what from the outside seems like a kind of dry economic or practical question of a monetary union.
- In Eastern Europe, Euroskepticism is a good barometer for proximity to Russia and sympathetic views on Russia, its activities in the region, and Russian culture and its history in Eastern Europe in general. For Eastern countries which have not joined the Euro yet, but which have signed agreements to eventually such as Romania or Hungary, the Euro represents an active question of total allegiance to US-by-proxy interests regarding Russia. For the two Scandinavian EU states which did not adopt the Euro - Denmark given an exemption from the original Maastricht treaty and Sweden being unofficially but firmly resisting what is supposed to be, under the letter of the law, an eventual adoption - the question is again of anti-Russian sentiment, but sometimes framed in social discourse, paradoxically, as a bulwark against Trumpian instability. There have been whispers of the talk in Sweden, famously neutral, and all the Scandinavian states, who like to see themselves as marching to the beat of their own drum. But times have changed, people have changed.
- Having recently lived through the most recent Euro adoption (Bulgaria in the beginning of this year) there is indeed the vague sense that we have given up a part of ourselves to join the faceless bureaucracy, as well as exasperation with inflation and rising prices. The Lev was not just "ours" but a living link to the beginning of modern Bulgarian independence. I think most people feel this way here, but the aforementioned social dialectic (a not entirely organic one, to me) seems to push out reasonable disappointment in favor of full-on Euro attachment or the usual pro-Russia right wing nonsense. Every Eurozone country has hints of melancholic nostalgia for their previous currencies, even those that have been in the Eurozone for decades at this point. One example that comes to mind is the cult video game My Summer Car, which takes place in Finland, but proudly shows some longing for the past by making the in-game currency their old Markki along with older car models, brands and so on. I think this quiet nostalgia for "what was once ours" isn't going to weaken any time soon, especially as European stagnation continues.
I guess I should add, since you did ask me for my personal opinion on things. Like I said, I don't like centralization of authority or strong authoritarianism of any kind. I think the appeal of authority is misanthropic as it reduces human beings to numbers or particles that need to be controlled, and reinforces a cycle of helplessness and overall degradation. I don't oppose bureaucratic structure on principle - like I am not, in a serious fashion, against car registration or passports or whatnot - but it's safe to say that the giant behemoth of European bureaucracy is huge and pretty much out of control. It seems to exist only to beget itself, something that happens in any gigantic bureaucratic structure like in the US, but in Europe it's just that much more pointless. Beyond that, I don't have a partisan view on east-west relations, I don't think Russia is the new Great Satan, I can clearly tell the heavy and manic American influence in Europe, both politically, socially, and in the propaganda department, and stemming from that, participating in the American war machine by proxy is something I am firmly against. I don't buy into the narrative that global polarity is inevitable and smaller countries must rush to be under a bigger brother's umbrella lest we end up like Cuba; well, at least, I think that international relations must play out as such to allow smaller nation-states to thrive independently, and that so-called "realpolitik" is a self-fulfilling prophecy.